Saturday, November 16, 2013

President Obama's Minority Report


The initial draft of this blog was created September 4th, 2013, while global tensions were building around the Syrian crisis. NOT EVER, do I believe, that children should be included in the world’s nonsensical games of power finagling, unfortunately they always are!!! Subsequently, I don’t believe that we should let their use blind our ability to question critically what is presented to us as 'fact'. As rubric cubes have more than one side, so, too, do events of fortune and misfortune.
Side note: The above video aired on 60 minutes on September 15th, 2013. Provided for contextualization.


The Minority Report, the Game of Risk and More Questions than Answers:


If micro-scale behaviors and solutions can be used to strategize and correlate outcomes on a macro-scale then two questions are to be asked with the Syrian events at our doorstep:

  • Could there be a minority report?
  • Are we suggesting that the use of conventional weaponry is an acceptable means of killing internal populations?

In our personal interactions we know that most people will not speak up if their commentary is not supported by the majority. We know that sharing a minority observation or suggestion is often detrimental to one’s own well-being despite the outcome potentially being better for the masses. This reality leaves me wondering about the current example of military support we are choosing to give the ‘moderate opposition’ forces inside Syria. They, themselves, have been noted for using chemical weapons and have been noted as a rouge group of potential bullies. So, “at the end of the day,” could it be that there is a minority report to the August 21st Syrian tragedy? In the light of a 99.9% certainty of usage, the .1% possibility might be worth assessing. In essence, does the presence of generals at the site of a major soft-target strike of chemical weapons mean that they were necessarily the ones to use the chemical weapons? In our own country we expect national official to show up and investigate major national disasters—their presence and investigation does not seal their guilt in carryout the disasters. Could there be a minority report?

If there is, then our choice to deter a sovereign government (albeit it a dictatorial dynasty) and make it accountable for potentially individual or rouge activities will not deter them from using extreme force against their internal population in the future. Nor, will it deter observing governments, particularly, since it has been stated and confirmed that the sovereign Assad government is seeking to rid its nation-state of externally funded opposing players—that would be us. Which leads us to the next question: Even if we remove the future threat of using chemical weapons, but continue to fund opposing forces in Syria does this mean that other forms of brutal force directed against the opposition faction will be ignored—ignored as long as they are using conventional weaponry?

Micro-scale situations tell us that when a determined authoritarian wants to enforce their believed ‘rights’ that they will lean towards more decisive and brutal measures unless there is a larger benefit or gain not to. On an international scale, similar internal acts of brutality (Myanmar, Nepal, Congo, Chile) all too often go uninterrupted by the international communities—simply because these acts do not entail the use of chemical weapons? Thus, are we suggesting that torture, disappearances, machetes, machine guns, burning of villages are acceptable choices of opposition control?

Well, while I agree that we have moral responsibilities to prevent the deaths of children worldwide whatever form of weapons, will ridding Syria of chemical weapons really change the mind-set or goal of the Assad regime to maintain power and to annihilate dissenting rebels within its borders? Or will it simply change the choice of violent force? In the game of Risk, one can sit for hours building his army while appearing to be of little or no threat and yet, make a decisive comeback with a different strategy and throw the leading players for a loop. Will we react then? And on a broader scale, given that Europe is known for having two sets of 100 year wars right up to the time when the remainder of their wars went off-continent, civil wars probably don’t have a great end-time in sight—kind of like the game of Risk, inexorably, they can go on forever. So, how long are we willing to back a historical opposition force and play tit for tat, while the reigning regime seeks other strategies to disable our play?

I found an interesting Quorum Feed on November 17th.